[Presidential Lecture]

The Effect of Conceptualization
on the Pragmatic Meaning of Politeness

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On the basis of the 'perspective view' of pragmatics, the present paper addresses the question of how particular forms of politeness expressions are selected by the speaker from cognitive perspective. It contends that, the pragmatic meaning of politeness can be accounted for as the effect of conceptualization. Based on reflexive perception of face, the speaker designs his message of politeness in a special manner by way of manipulating construal operations. To demonstrate this, politeness expressions are analyzed in light of various types of construal operations (e.g. framing, vantage point, foreground-background alignment). We then present a general principle of construal operations for politeness, with which we further discuss how construal operations for positive politeness and negative politeness can be characterized with respect to the type of predication.

Keywords:　perspective view, politeness, face, cognitive pragmatics, conceptualization, construal, effect

I.　Introduction

　　One of the theoretical debates on pragmatics is whether it should be defined either as a sub-discipline of linguistics or as a perspective of linguistics (Herberland 2010: 55). Within the conception of the former approach, or the 'component view', pragmatics constitutes "a core component of a theory of language on a par with phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics" (Huang 2007: 4). Also, it is often associated with a delimited set of topics such as dixes, implicature, presupposition, reference, and speech acts, which themselves may be considered as sub-disciplines of the discipline of pragmatics (Haberland 2010: 55). On the other hand, within the conception of the latter approach, or the 'perspective view', it is defined as a discipline which 1) offers a functional—i.e. cognitive, social and cultural—perspective on linguistic phenomena and 2) does so at any level /or unit of linguistic structure or any type of form-meaning relationship (Verschueren 1999: 2, 7).[1] While the former view more strongly represents the traditional concern of philosophical analysis of language, it is the latter view

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[1] Huang (2007: 4–5) identifies the two schools of thought, the component view and the perspective views as 'Anglo-American' and 'European', respectively.

which is closer to the original definition of pragmatics presented by Morris (1938): The following two quotes from his writing reveal how his idea is reflected in the latter view:

> "since, if not all, signs have as their interpreters living organisms, it is a sufficiently accurate characterization of pragmatics to say that *it deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with all the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the function of signs*" (Morris 1938: 30; italics added)

> "syntactical rules determine the sign relations between sign vehicles; semantical rules correlate sign vehicles with other objects; pragmatical rules state the conditions in the interpreters under which the sign vehicle is a sign. *Any rule when actually in use operates as a type of behavior, and in this sense there is a pragmatical component in all rules.*" (Morris 1938: 35; italics added) [2]

One of the important characteristics of the perspective approach, upon which the present paper is based, is its strong concern with the motive behind which particular linguistic expressions are chosen by the speaker (Haberland and Mey 1977; Haberland 2010). The perspective view of pragmatics contends that the speaker chooses particular expressions because they evoke particular meanings to 'adapt to' the communicative needs of the speaker (Verschueren 1999: 61−68). One question relevant to this view is: "What is the logic of utterance design that underlies this adaptation?" In the next section we will discuss how this question pertains to the perspective view of pragmatics.

2.　A pragmatic question par excellence

One of the basic assumptions of the perspective school is that the meaning of utterances can only be described satisfactorily when they are analyzed in connection with the people who produce and interpret them in functional terms. Haberland and Mey (1977: 5) formulate a unifying research question for this perspective by saying "the pragmatic question *par excellence* is [...] not: What does an utterance mean? but: How did this utterance come to be produced?" More recently, Haberland (2010: 57), who elaborated on this question in the 12th issue of this journal, reformulated it as "The question is: how come that this utterance (and not any other) fits the particular communicative needs of the participants in a situation?" In the paper he argues that this pragmatic question par excellent generates new research questions such as "Why was this utterance transcribed in this way?", "Why has an utterance been produced in this language?" and "Why has this metapragmatic act has been performed?" (2010: 57−64).

Social functions are a prime candidate for motivation in choices the speaker makes

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[2] See Huang (2007: 4−5) and Verschueren (1999: 6) for more discussion on this point.

of linguistic resources and, as such, politeness is one of the crucial candidates for a functional explanation of why particular linguistic forms are used (Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978], henceforth B&L). The aim of this paper is to discuss from cognitive perspective how a particular utterance has come to be selected as the one which fits the communicative needs of the speaker.[3] Our new pragmatic question par excellence addressed in this paper is: *"Why has the speaker chosen to design his message in this way (i.e. with this word or with this construction)?"* We will discuss the logic of the speaker's utterance design from cognitive perspective by looking into the effect of conceptualization upon the pragmatic meaning of politeness.

3. Meaning as conceptual effect

The term *effect* has been used by many scholars in various ways to define linguistic meaning. Its use can be traced as far back as the 'triadic theory of sign' by semiotician Charles Peirce (1839−1914). He argued that meaning is the effect of sign on the mind of an interpreter, saying that meaning of 'representamen' (or sign) manifests in 'interpretant' or what results from a process of its interpretation by 'interpreters' (Short 2004). A philosophical linguist Grice (1957) formulated ('non-natural') meaning by stating that the speaker means something when he intends to cause some effects in the hearer via the hearer's recognition of that intention.[4] More recently, Sperber & Wilson (1986) contends that it is the 'contextual effect' of an utterance that constitutes communication; the speaker uses an utterance to modify or improve the context or the representation of the hearer's world.

The effect that the present paper is concerned is of conceptual kind. That is, it is the effect of conceptualization on pragmatic meaning, by which the meaning of an expression will be inferentially understood as the one intended by the speaker. Our thesis is that polite meaning of an expression can be accounted for by looking into the cognitive mechanism of conceptualization. Before elaborating on this point, we will first discuss the relationship between linguistic forms and our perception of the world in the next section.

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[3] This is one of the studies based on what we call 'cognitive pragmatics', a new analytical framework with which we look into various pragmatic phenomena from the perspective of cognitive linguistics (e.g. Yamanashi 2001, 2009, Hayashi 2009c, d).

[4] Grice (1968: 58) defines non-natural meaning (or meaning$_{NN}$) as follows:

"U meant (non-naturally) something by uttering x", [which can be formulated as] "For some audience A, U intended his utterance of x to produce in A some effect (response) E, by means of A's recognition of that intention." The difference between natural meaning (meaning$_N$) and non-natural meaning (meaning$_{NN}$) is often illustrated by his examples, *Those spots mean (meant) measles* (meaning$_N$) and *Those three rings on the bell mean that the bus is full* (meaning$_{NN}$).

3.1.　Language as a representation of the world.

The idea that language represents our perception of the world can be traced back to the claim of Ferdinand de Saussure, who held that our conception of reality comes into existence only through categorical organization of the world by 'naming' (de Saussure 1916).　He argued that language is a conventional sign system through which the world is conceptually dissected by the arbitrary pairings of the signifier (signifiant) and the signified (signifié).　Underlying his argument is the assumption that the world can only be seized linguistically by the (conceptual) difference between things or that it is the (conceptual) difference between things that creates linguistic meaning.　In principle, the idea that language represents our perception is also congruent with Sapir (1929)'s claim that language habits build up distinct 'real worlds' (the notion called 'linguistic determinism') and speakers of different languages think differently since no two languages represent the same reality (the notion called 'linguistic relativity').[5]

More recently, cognitive linguists pointed out that this paring relationship between form and meaning is not as arbitrary as traditional structural linguists claimed; and furthermore, that it can be systematically accounted for as function of cognitive operations (e.g. Fillmore 1982, Lakoff 1987a, Langacker 1987, Talmy 1985).　They argue that form-meaning mapping process reflects the way entity, relation or process is profiled by different linguistic forms (Langacker 1987).　For example, a philosophical question regarding the difference between *the glass is half full* and *the glass is half empty* can be explained as the difference in construal (i.e. the difference in how the glass with some content is profiled) (see Figure 1 in 3.2).　As we will demonstrate below, their approach can shed light on the explanation of how a particular linguistic form is used to produce some effect on pragmatic meaning.

3.2.　Conceptualization

As mentioned above, cognitive linguistics takes the position that the meaning of a linguistic form represents a reality constructed by the person who uses it.　It holds that this construction reflects conceptualization or "our manifest ability to conceive and portray the same situation in alternate ways" (Langacker 2008: 43).　This means that different meanings are derived from different conceptualizations.　It then follows that alternative expressions to describe the same situation are the consequences of different ways of conceptualization.　Langacker (2008: 30-31) claims that meaning is not *concept* but *conceptualization*; he uses the latter term to highlight the dynamic nature of meaning

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[5] There are two positions on the relationship between language and thought (Bruner et. al. 1956: 11).　One is 'mold theory', which says language is a 'mold' by which thought is categorically cast and the other is 'cloak theory', which says language is a 'cloak' that reflects the category of thought.　We might say that the so-called Sapir-Whorf theory takes the position of the former and cognitive semantics takes the position of the latter position.

which involves cognitive processing. For him, conceptualization encompasses a wide variety of mental experiences that includes "(1) both novel and established conceptions; (2) not just 'intellectual' notions but sensory, motor, and emotive experience; (3) apprehension of the physical, linguistic, social, and cultural context; and (4) conceptions that develop and unfold through processing time." (Langacker 2008: 30) That is, conceptualization concerns elements of discourse/pragmatic matters that include politeness.

Linguistic meaning of conceptualization can be described by 1) 'conceptual content' or conceived content of reality (or experience) in a fairly neutral manner and 2) 'construal' or portrayal of the same conceived content (or reality) in alternate ways (Langacker 2008: 44-54) Whenever the speaker encodes a conceived content, a certain construal is imposed on it.

Conceptual content can be described in terms of 'domain', which refers to any kind of conception or realm of experience that concerns various aspects of encyclopedic knowledge associated with our experience of the world (Langacker 2008: 44-54). A linguistic expression or a lexeme evokes a set of multiple domains of basic type (or primitive concepts) (e.g. color, space, pitch and temperature) and of non-basic type (or 'higher-level' notions) (e.g. work, contract, employment), which constitute a conceptual 'matrix'.[6] The matrix of domains for the conception of a glass containing water, for example, may include any domains of basic and non-basic types such as space, the sensation of wetness, concepts of water and liquid, the conception of a container and its contents, the conception of filling a container with liquid, and our knowledge of filling water in a glass for drinking it (Langacker 2008: 44-45).[7]

The notion of construal is directly relevant to the question addressed in the present study, i.e., "Why has the speaker chosen to design his message in this way?" It refers to the choice among alternative ways to perceiving and portraying the world, which imposes on the speaker's choice of words and grammatical constructions. Many construal operations involve our ability to 'profile' things. For example, the conception of a glass containing water can be coded in several ways depending on how the speaker profiles its content (see Figure 1) (Langacker 2008: 43-44) :[8]

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[6] The domains of non-basic type correspond to Fillmore's (1982) 'frame' and Lakoff (1987b)'s 'idealized cognitive model' (Langacker 2008: 43).

[7] All of these domains are of non-basic type except for space. Langacker (2008: 45) argues that most domains are non-basic and (non-basic) higher-level domains are related to basic ones through the mediation of intermediate-level domains.

[8] Langacker (2008: 43) notes, however, that the distinction between the two is not absolute. The level of specificity (an aspect of construal), for example, has a direct bearing on the invoked content as can be seen in the two expressions, *the glass with water in it* and *the container with liquid in it*, where the former has more content.

Construal 1 : *the glass with water in it* (the container is profiled)
Construal 2 : *the water in the glass* (the liquid is profiled)
Construal 3 : *the glass is half full* (the volume of the liquid occupied is profiled)
Construal 4 : *the glass is half empty* (the volume of the liquid left is profiled)

Conceptual   Construal$_1$ Construal$_2$ Construal$_3$ Construal$_4$
Content

Figure 1: Construal by profiling (Langacker 2008: 44)

A wide range of construal operations in a variety of groupings have been proposed. Langacker (2008: 55) discusses these based on visual metaphor dividing them into four broad classes: 1) specificity (or descriptive level of precision), 2) focusing (or selection and arrangement of content) (e.g. foreground vs. backgrounding), 3) prominence (or profiling) (e.g. profiling) and 4) perspective (or the vantage point) (e.g. viewing arrangement). In Talmy (1988), construal operations are described as imaging systems under the headings of 1) structural schematization (e.g. state of boundedness) 2) deployment of perspective (e.g. perspective mode), 3) distribution of attention (e.g. level of synthesis) and 4) force dynamics (e.g. resistance to force). Croft and Cruse (2004) present a more comprehensive list of construal operations including all the construal operations and image schemas discussed above under four main headings: 1) attention/salience (e.g. selection), 2) judgment/comparison (e.g. categorization), 3) perspective/situatedness (e.g. viewpoint) and 4) constitution/gestalt (e.g. force dynamics).

4.　Politeness and conceptualization

In this paper we will promote the view that politeness is one of the prime motivators for functional explanations grammatical organization. We argue that the speaker's choice of linguistic forms is motivated by *conceptualization via reflexive face perception.*

4.1.　Dual model of face

While the theory of politeness by B&L has been considered as one of the most influential analytical frameworks of politeness, we will present a somewhat different argument of it by drawing upon Hayashi's (2009a, b) model, which is a modified version of B&L's.

One of the important claims of Hayashi's model is that linguistic politeness is de-rived from dualistic aspects of face. The first of these postulates that face can be sche-matically represented by two hierarchical levels (see Figure 2). Since each level con-sists of two components we refer to the model as the 'dual model of face'.[9] At Level 1, which constitutes the basic content of face, is Cognitive Face. It refers to conceptual consciousness of self-identity and corresponds to B&L's face as claim.

Cognitive Face has two components: One is Private Face, which concerns psycho-logical construct of a person on private matters (e.g. emotion, character, possessions and belief). The other is Social Face, which concerns psychological construct of a person on social matters (e.g. identity, role, power and relationship). At Level 2 is Affective Face. It refers to emotional consciousness of self-love and corresponds to B&L's face as want (Affective Face is in a superordinate relation to Cognitive Face as the definition of face using brackets below suggests). Affective face consists of two components, Positive Face or the desire that one's psychological construct of self (at Level 1) be ac-knowledged, confirmed and reinforced, and Negative Face or the desire that one's psy-chological construct of self (at Level 1) be protected and unimpeded. The two desires arise from the dualistic characteristics that a person is both a social organism of de-pendent existence and an individualistic organism of independent existence.

(Level 2: Affective Face)   (Level 1: Cognitive Face)

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                                    ┌── Private Face
                   Negative Face ───┤
                  ╱                 └── Social Face
        Face ────┤
                  ╲                 ┌── Private Face
                   Positive Face ───┤
                                    └── Social Face
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
Figure 2: Dual model of face (Hayashi 2009a, b)

Another important claim of this model is that face is reflexively perceived. By re-flexive perception we mean the speaker's perceiving of the interlocutor's perception of his own (interlocutor's) face. This is adopted from Arundale (1997)'s notion of face, which he constructs from communicative construction theory of a person that the per-ception of an individual person in communication is mutually constructed by orienting to the perception of others. He defines face as the speaker's projection of how close the

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[9] In this model, duality is regarded as the fundamental nature of a human being as a person. Face in this model is defined as psychological construct about a person, who is bound to the dual traits of human being as a person, i.e. an individual in a group with a distinct mind, body and emotion, and at the same time, an individual in a group bound by the value, role and relationship of a group (Hayashi 2009a, b).

interlocutor perceives his relationship to the speaker.[10] Within the dual model of face, we can describe face as psychological construct of [my perceiving of [your perceiving of [your affective face of [your conceptual face of [your person (or my person)]]]]]. More precisely, it is [my perceiving of [your perceiving of [your negative/positive face of [your private/social face of [your person (or my person)]]]]]. As we will contend below, it is the reflexive aspect of face that motivates a particular conceptualization. [11]

4.2. Dual model of politeness

Given the definition of face above, politeness can be defined as strategic expressions of message based on reflexive face perception. It indicates to the other person how the speaker interprets the other person's psychological construct. More specifically, it is a demonstration of the speaker's perception of negative/positive face of private/social face of the other person. It is strategic in that reflexive perception of face is aimed at deriving a particular pragmatic effect. Strategies of politeness are also dualistic in the sense that they are not only negative or positive but also private or social as shown in Figure 3.[12]


Figure 3: Dual model of politeness (Hayashi 2009a, b)

As we mentioned above, politeness is one of the prime functional sources of various linguistic forms. What we will attempt to show in the next section is to demonstrate that one's expression of reflexive face perception (or how one perceives the face of other person) motivates how one construes conceptual content to generate the meaning of politeness. In other words we argue that [my perceiving of [your perceiving of affective face of [your perceiving of cognitive face of [your person]]]] motivates [my

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[10] When an even more complex reflexivity is involved, it can be formulated as [my perceiving of [your perceiving of [my perceiving of [your person (or my person)]]]].

[11] This aspect of face has to do with intersubjectivity. Traugott (2010: 33) contends that "… intersubjectivity in my view refers to the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent's expression of his or her awareness of the addressee's attitudes and beliefs, most especially their 'face' or 'self-image'."

[12] Our model shown in this chart is simpler than that of B&L. We consider their dichotomies of 'do the FTA' vs. 'Don't do the FTA' and 'on record' vs. 'off record' themselves do not concern strategies but manners by which negative or negative politeness is expressed.

construal of [your construal of [conceptual content]]]] to generate pragmatic effect of politeness.

5. Analyses

One of the fundamental assumptions of cognitive linguistics is that a particular symbolic structure is used because the speaker choses to perceive, comprehend, and interpret the world in a particular way. In other words, a particular utterance is used because the speaker choses to construe the word in a particular way. In this section we will discuss how politeness can be accounted for by conceptualization and how it is triggered by reflexive face perception. We will demonstrate, through analysis of various expressions, how the choice of expressions dictated by construal operations affects their meanings and how their meanings are interpreted as polite. More specifically, it will be shown that the speaker can exploit construal operations by profiling (or un-profiling) particular entity, relation or process that is relevant to reflexive perception of face with the intention that selected linguistic forms will be pragmatically interpreted as polite. The analysis will be presented based on construal operations based primarily on Langacker (1987, 2008).

5.1. Positive politeness and conceptualization

In this section we will demonstrate how the designing of various expressions of positive politeness can be accounted for as a function of manipulative construal operation and how such conceptualization, through reflexive face perception, has the effect on the pragmatic meaning of politeness. Construal operations which we will refer to here are framing, trajectory/landmark alignment (focal prominence), and vantage point.

5.1.1. Framing

We understand the meaning of a word based on its conceptual structure called 'frame' (Fillmore 1977, 1982), or a conceptually integrated functional knowledge consisting of experiential and socio-cultural elements. For example, in *My dad wasted most of the morning on the bus,* a pair of words *dad* and *father or waste* and *spend* have different meanings because each of them evokes different pieces of knowledge within a different frame (Fillmore 1985: 230-31). Langacker uses the term 'domains' to refer to all kinds of facts, features, and attributes profiled by a lexeme (Langacker 2008: 48-50).[13] He points out that one of the facets of linguistic meaning is that there is a varying degree of centrality of domains that constitutes a 'conceptual matrix'. That is, a lexeme has a different degree of accessibility to different domains and not only are

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[13] Langacker (2008: 44-47) discusses two types of domains, i.e.,'basic' and 'nonbasic', and notes that 'frames' are comparable to the latter.

a set of domains accessed by a lexeme but they are preferentially done so with respect to the centrality. For example, the word *escargot* evokes the domain of fancy cuisine, which is more central, while the word *snail* does not afford the access to that domain easily. Likewise, the word *dagger* has a higher accessibility to the functional domain of stabbing than the word *knife* (Langacker 2008: 49).

The speaker can strategically use words with an intention to induce a particular frame which evokes particular conceptual contents or domains. When a special lexicon is chosen by the speaker, it is often done so because the speaker knows (that the hearer knows) that it evokes particular elements included in its frame. The speaker may select a word that has specific socio-cultural meanings that can be associated with the face of the interlocutor. The use of a word *dining* in (1) is one such example. It is a referent honorific by which social domains such as formality or higher class are accessed easily.

> (1)   We look forward very much to *dining* with you.   (B&L: 181)

The choice of a word *dining* (instead of a more commonly used word *eating*) is made by reflexive face perception of positive kind, which is congruent with such social domains. For example, for cognitive (social) face, the speaker (S) may think the hearer (H) thinks H is a higher-positioned person, and for affective (positive) face, S may think H wants S to show a respect for H's social position. The word *dining* is used because it can bring the communicative effect of positive (social) politeness. S can indirectly show an elevated view of H by associating H with the social connotation of the word (cf. B&L: 178).[14]

The speaker may choose to use special words that evoke domains pertaining to social relationship of closeness (or distance) between the speaker and the addressee as in (2).

> (2)   Come here *mate (honey, buddy).*   (B&L: 108)

In this example, FTA is softened by diminutives that suggest endearments. Relevant conceptual contents evoked by such terms include domains of friendliness, social bond, membership, and solidarity. The evocation of these domains is derived from a reflexive perception of face. For cognitive (social) face, it is of the kind that S thinks H thinks H and S are in-group members; and for affective (positive) face, it is of the kind that S thinks H wants S to use an address term that indicates intimacy. It is through the reflexive perception of face of this kind that motivates the conceptualization involving conceptual contents mentioned above. These address forms produce, by implication, a

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[14] Notice that while the use of (referent) honorifics is treated as a negative politeness strategy in B&L, in our model it is considered as a positive politeness strategy (for this position, see Pizziconi (2003: 1485–1486)).

pragmatic effect of in-group solidarity for positive politeness.

5.1.2. Trajectory/landmark alignment (focal prominence)

As in visual perception, the speaker often pays attention to particular things when describing the world. When attention is paid to more than two entities, the asymmetrical relationship of attention can be expressed structurally by making one of the related entities semantically more prominent than others. An entity with primary focus within the profiled relationship is called a 'trajector' (tr), and the other entity with secondary focus in the relationship is called a 'landmark' (lm) (Langacker 1987: 217–220, 2008: 72–73). This asymmetrical alignment of construal becomes significant when the speaker makes a different choice of trajectory and landmark for the same content and relationship. For example, (3a) and (3b) describe the same content and spatial relationship, yet their meaning is subtly different due to trajectory/landmark alignment. In constructions such as *X is above Y*, *X equals Y*, or *X resembles Y*, X stands out as more prominent because, conceptually, Y represents a reference point of X (Langacker 1987: 231).

> (3) (a) The kite (tr) is *above* the car (lm).
>
>   (b) The car (tr) is *below* the kite (lm).

The trajectory/landmark alignment may be contextually determined; (3a) may be used for a question *Where is the kite?* while (3b) may be used for a question *Where is the car?* This alignment can be manipulated for a pragmatic purpose. See (4), where the addressee's kite is described in reference to the speaker's own.

> (4) *Your kite* is flying above *mine*.

The structural alignment suggests that a more attention (prominence) is given to the addressee's kite in the profiled relationship for positive politeness. This is motivated by a reflexive perception of face that, for cognitive (social) face, S thinks H thinks H is a higher-positioned person or a close friend, and for affective (positive) face, S thinks H wants S to highlight H's possessions. The derived construal operation of the asymmetrical relation between the profiled entities gives this structural design, which in turn produces pragmatic effect that the speaker intends to show empathy to the addressee.

5.1.3. Vantage point

When the speaker describes a scene, he can project it differently depending on how he sees it. That is, perceived entities can be described in different ways according to the view point (or perspective) the speaker takes. Langacker (1987) proposes two types of viewpoint, 'vantage point' or "the position from which a scene is viewed" (e.g. looking at a house from a different place) (p. 122) and 'orientation' or "the alignment with respect to the axes of the visual field"(e.g. looking at a kite in the canonical upright position or on one's head) (p. 122). A particular vantage point (VP) imposes a particular alignment of foreground-background (and trajectory-landmark) relation. For example, a

scene with a rock and a tree can be coded differently depending on the position of the speaker, i.e., whether the speaker is on the side of the rock in which case the rock is between the tree and the viewer, or the speaker is on the side of the tree in which case the tree is between the rock and the viewer (see (5a)).

(5)　(a)　VP1 → (a rock)—(a tree) ← VP2

　　　(b)　VP1:　The rock (tr) is in front of the tree (lm).
　　　　　　　　The tree (tr) is behind the rock (lm).

　　　(c)　VP2:　The tree (tr) is in front of the rock (lm).
　　　　　　　　The rock (tr) is behind the tree (lm).

(Langacker 2008: 76)

Whereas (5b) is appropriate when the viewer is near the rock, (5c) is appropriate when the viewer is located near the tree. As discussed in the previous section, it is the entity coded as a trajector that gets more relational prominence rather than the one coded as a landmark. Notice that within each of the vantage point (i.e. VP1, VP2) the relational prominence in the pair of sentences is reversed due to the use of two different prepositions with contrastive meanings (i.e. *in front of* and *behind*). In communication, however, the speaker's choice of construction is determined not only by trajectory/landmark alignment but by vantage point alignment (and interaction between the two). Consider (6a) to see how vantage point is closely related to its effect upon pragmatic meaning of politeness.

(6)　(a)　VP1 → (his house)—(your house) ← VP2

　　　(b)　VP1:　His house (tr) is in front of your house (lm).
　　　　　　　　Your house (tr) is behind his house (lm).

　　　(c)　VP2:　Your house (tr) is in front of his house (lm).
　　　　　　　　His house(tr) is behind your house (lm).

Both of the sentences in (6c) are politer than those in (6b) because their construction suggests that the speaker is taking the addressee's perspective The effect of construal upon politeness is of the kind which Kuno and Kaburaki (1977) called 'empathy', or the speakers' identification with a person or a thing.[15] The first of the two sentences in (6c) can be said to be the most polite because the addressee's house is coded as a trajector in the subject position. Relevant conceptual contents evoked by this construal include domains of closeness, bonding, priority, membership, and solidarity. This conceptualization is derived from a reflexive perception of face such that, for cognitive (social)

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[15] They argue, for example, that when multiple arguments are used, the speaker is easier to empathize with the referent in the subject position than with that in other positions (e.g. John met Mary (E (John) > E (Mary)) (Kuno and Kaburaki 1977: 647). The notion of empathy is also relevant to the effect of trajectory/landmark alignment discussed above.

face, S thinks H thinks H is an important and close person, and for affective (positive) face, S thinks H wants S to show that S has a strong bond with H.

By the same token, the use of a deictic verb *come* in (7) can be analyzed as a function of vantage point.

(7)   Oh, you're acting in *Othello* tomorrow night, are you? I'll *come* and watch you from the gallery.   (B&L: 122)

Come is a spatial deixis which is usually used to describe a movement of an entity toward the speaker where the vantage point is located. In (7), however, the speaker manipulates vantage point by moving the location of speaking to that of the addressee to show empathy (i.e. positive politeness). That is, the deictic anchorage is switched to the location of the addressee by taking the role of the addressee's point of view. The use of *come* (instead of *go*) is licensed by association of geographical closeness with psychological closeness, whereas the use of *go* suggests a distance or non-empathy (B&L: 122).

5.2.   Negative politeness and conceptualization

Following the analytic format in the previous section, we will now demonstrate how the designing of various expressions of negative politeness can be accounted for as a function of manipulative construal operations and how conceptualization, through reflexive face perception, has the effect on the pragmatic meaning of politeness. Construal operations which we will refer to here are figure-ground (foreground-background) alignment, foregrounding of scope, profiling and grounding.

5.2.1.   Figure-ground (foreground-background) alignment

One of the fundamental features of cognition is that when we focus on something, one part of it stands out from the remainder. This kind of asymmetrical arrangement of conceptual content is referred to as 'figure-ground' (or 'foreground-background') alignment. The construal of figure-ground distinction manifests in various linguistic expressions. A notable example is the expression of things that involves spatial relation like (8), where *the cat* and *the carpet* function as figure and ground respectively.

(8)   The cat is on the carpet.

The linguistic realization of figure-ground alignment is not limited to noun phrases referring to entities and it is also found between clauses (Croft and Cruse 2004: 56–57). In (9), two events are asymmetrically described by two clauses, with the main clause representing the event of reading of a paper as figure and the subordinate clause the event of waiting for a train as ground.

(9)   He often read a paper while he was waiting for a train.

The figure-ground relation between clauses may be inverted depending on the context

(Langacker 2008: 59). While the main clause *I think* is in foregrounded status in the context of (10a), in (10b) it is in the background status, where it is moved after the main clause (and usually pronounced without accent).

(10)　(a)　*I think* that Taro would become a good doctor.

　　　(b)　Taro would become a good doctor, *I think.*

Also, this figure-ground relation can be manipulated by the speaker for a communicative purpose. In (11), for example, the expression *I suppose (guess/think)* in the main clause is inserted as a hedge to convey negative politeness.

(11)　*I suppose (guess/think)* that Harry is coming.　　　　　(B&L: 145)

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(italics added)

By foregrounding the hedged proposition in the main clause, the speaker suggests that the assertion in the subordinate clause is only personal and therefore may not be true.[16] The reflexive perception of face would be of the kind that S thinks H thinks H has his own belief (cognitive personal face) and S thinks H does not want to be presumptive of his (affective negative) face. The conceptual contents involved in this construal include elements of stance such as non-imposition, non-commitment and personal view, which make the proposition in the subordinate clause less forceful.

5.2.2.　Foregrounding of scope

　　Another important aspect of focusing is that it is surrounded by a 'scope' of attention or a periphery of consciousness that can be accessed by an expression (Croft and Cruse 2004: 50). The most limited extent of domains that are central and directly relevant to the focus is called 'immediate scope' while the fullest extent of domains that are only indirectly relevant to the focus is called 'maximal scope' (Langacker 2008: 62-66). An expression's immediate scope is foregrounded against its maximal scope. The distinction between the two scopes can be illustrated by the terms of body parts, which have whole-part hierarchies (Langacker 2008: 65). For example, for *knuckle*, FINGER functions as immediate scope and BODY functions as maximal scope. In between FINGER and BODY are also other immediate scopes, i.e., HAND evoked by FINGER and ARM evoked by HAND. This distinction can also be applied in the domain of time. A case in point is the comparison between the non-progressive form and the progressive form (*be-ing*) of a verb (e.g. *is swimming* vs. *swim*). The two forms differ with respect to how they impose the scope of an event in the temporal domain (see Figure 4).

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[16] The cognitive mechanism involved in (16) can also be explained by the concept of 'mental space' (Fauconinier 1994). Namely, the hedge maps a main assertion to 'belief space' of a personal kind.

(a)   *V*   (b)   *be Ving*

MS/IS   MS
                                    IS

t   t

Figure 4: Scope in the temporal domain (Langacker 2008: 65)

As Figure 4 shows, while there is no distinction between the maximal scope and the immediate scope for the non-progressive form, the progressive form has both maximal scope and immediate scope in the temporal domain (Langacker 2008: 65). The progressive form designates both an entire bounded event and only some of its internal portion excluding the end points of the event (Langacker 2008: 65). That is, the progressive form represents a kind of construal by which an event in progress is foregrounded (focused) against the background of an entire event. In communication, the speaker may strategically use the progressive form in order to convey politeness (Leech 2004: 29). In both (12a) and (12b), the progressive form (*forgetting* and *hoping*) is used (instead of the past tense form *forgot* or the present tense *hope*) to suggest that the action asserted is in progress and has not been completed.

(12)   (a)   You *are forgetting* a moral argument against the use of drugs.
       (b)   I *am hoping* you can lend me your car this afternoon.

The implication in (12a) is that the action will soon terminate and the addressee may in the future remember the moral argument. Negative politeness is derived by refraining from asserting that the action of forgetting is completed. The conceptual content involved in the construal includes incompleteness, limited time period, beginning and ending. The construal is derived from the speaker's reflexive perception of the kind that, for cognitive (private) face, S thinks H thinks S has much pride in his argument, and for affective (negative) face, S thinks H wants S not to be coerced. By the same token, the progressive form in (12b) suggests that the speaker's desire of borrowing the addressee's car is only temporary.

5.2.3. Profiling

Focus of attention also involves singling out a particular substructure of some conception. The cognitive operation of making a substructure become salient or prominent is called 'profiling'. For example, English words *hub*, *spoke*, *rim*, differ with respect to which part is profiled within a conceptual base of a wheel (Langacker 2008: 67). Profiling is also relevant to the schematic characterization of the two grammatical categories noun and verb (Langacker 1987: 246-248, 2008: 103-112). While noun is a symbolic expression which typically designates things (including living entities such as man), verb refers to processes. It is important to note that the meaning of the two cate-

gories differ not only in terms of the temporal dimension but in terms of relational predication (Langacker 1987: 247). That is, while nouns designate things that are conceptually independent (in the sense that they can be conceptualized without participants), verbs designate things that are conceptually dependent (in the sense that they cannot be conceptualized without participants) (Langacker 1987: 104). In other words, the distinction between the two is that while verbs profile participants and their relation (at every point throughout of their temporal profile), nouns do not (though participants are conceived as distributed within a set) (Langacker 1987: 247) (see the contrast between (a) and (c) in Figure 5).


Figure 5: Contrast of profiling (Langacker 1987: 247)

In communication, the same reality may be expressed either by a nominal form or verbal form depending on the intention of the speaker. If the speaker wants to make explicit the participants of a process, the predication may be expressed by a verbal form as in (13a), where the actor (i.e. the speaker) and the patient (i.e. the hearer) are profiled. If the speaker chooses to represent it as unitary activity, it can be expressed by a nominal form (*your corporation*) as in (13b). As far as its effect on politeness is concerned, (13b) is politer than (13a) since the latter does not profile the actor who performs the face threatening act (hereafter FTA) of requesting.

(13) (a) I urgently request you to cooperate with me.
　　 (b) An urgent request is made for *your corporation*.　　　(B&L: 208)

Likewise, an indirect request of (14b) is politer since it is expressed with a nominalized form (*your assistance*). (14a) is more coercive than (14b) since it profiles the participants involved in the FTA.

(14) (a) Can you give me a hand with this?
　　 (b) I would appreciate *your assistance* in this matter.

The reflexive perception of face which triggers these nominalized expressions would be S thinks H thinks H is a person of great pride (cognitive personal face) and S thinks H does not want his freedom of action to be impinged upon (affective negative face). By the same token, but in a reverse sense, (15a) is ruder than (15b) since the use of performatives can make commands more face-threatening (B&L: 190–191).

(15)　(a)　I order you to leave!

　　　(b)　Leave.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Langaker 2008: 469−470)

The use of performative in (15a) involves a related construal operation called 'objectification', which is one type of viewing arrangement or perspective (Langaker 2008: 469−470). In this sentence the act of ordering and the participants are construed objectively. That is, both the act of ordering and the profiled participants on stage are identical with the speech event of ordering and the interlocutors (or the speaker and the hearer) in the ground. (Langaker 2008: 469−470). Whereas in (15b), the ordering is construed subjectively and the participants are put off stage. The objective construal (of viewing the speaker and the hearer as on-stage participants) makes the command more forceful for it suggests that the speaker is firmly in control of the hearer (Langacker 2008: 469).

5.2.4.　Grounding

Things or events are usually described egocentrically from the perspective of the speaker or relative to where the speaker is situated. The cognitive process that underlies the linguistic specification of referents in this manner is referred to as 'grounding' (Langacker 2008: 259−309). It is the process through which the semantic content of an expression is subjectively linked to a particular domain of speech situation. Grounding can be most readily illustrated by deictic expressions. They include the use of pronouns that designate participants (e.g. *I*, *you*), adverbials that situate location of circumstance (e.g. *here*, *there*), and tense markers that identify temporal setting (e.g. *will*, *-ed*), all of which represent codification of referents or evens relative to their 'ground' or the context of the speech event.[17]

As for grounding of tense, the difference between present and past can also be characterized in terms of more general proximal/distal distinction. That is, while the present tense usually signals that the profiled situation of an event takes place at a time proximal to the speaking time, the past tense indicates that the profiled situation takes place at a time distal to the speaking time. Since the proximal/distal contrast can be associated with actual /non-actual (non-real) difference, past tense forms can be used to suggest that the present situation is unreal or counterfactual (B&L: 204). In (16a) through (16d), the speaker uses past tense to refer to the present situation. It is as if the speaker moves into the future, thereby distancing himself from the speech act he is currently performing (Radden and Dirven 2007: 210−211, Tailor 2003: 394−95).

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17 According to Taylor (2002), ground "comprises the participants in the event, its time and place, the situational context, previous discourse, shared knowledge of the speech-act participants, and such like" (p. 346). For Langacker (2008: 259), ground also applies to modal auxiliaries such as *may*, *will*, and *should*, by which predication is expressed in reference to the current conception of reality by the speaker.

(16) (a) What was your name again?

(b) Did you want something to drink?

(c) Did you want a bag?

(d) I wondered if you could help me.

In these examples, the speaker manipulates the ground in order to soften or reduce FTA. This involves the speaker's reflexive perception of face of the sort that S thinks H thinks H has higher social status than S (cognitive social face), and S thinks H wants S does not want to be bothered (affective negative face). The conceptual contents that are relevant to such perception include non-imposition, low involvement, non-reality and distance. The (pseudo-)construal operation involved in the structural design is that the FTA is not proximal to the speaking time.

This kind of manipulation can also be made by the future tense as in (17).

(17) *Will* it be okay if I call you tonight?

Here the stance of non-involvement (or non-imposition) is conveyed by manipulating ground; the effect of this construal is that the action of inquiry is not of immediate kind and the proposition is no-assertive (i.e. non-imposing). The manipulation of tense can be combined with that of aspect that we discussed above. In (18), the metaphorical use of past progressive form makes the request more polite since the progressive form profiles the action as unbounded (see 5.2.2).

(18) I *was wondering* whether you could do me a little favour.　　　　(B&L: 204)

The speaker can exploit this mechanism in a reverse manner by using a proximal form to describe a past event. In this case, tense shift is intended for positive (and not for negative) face. In (19) tense is strategically switched from past to present to derive the effect of vividness (B&L: 121).

(19) John *says* he really loves your roses.

6. Discussion

As demonstrated above, the effect of politeness can be accounted for as a function of the effect of various construal operations. The analysis of the operations above suggests that it is possible to postulate a general principle of construal operations for politeness. Shown in (20) is a rough formulation of such principle. We will elaborate this working principle by referring back to the points discussed in Section 5.

(20) Foreground positive /negative face of others for positive/negative politeness.

The construal operations for positive politeness identified above are of two kinds. One of them involves profiling conceptual contents relevant to the identity and desire of

the other person (e.g. (1), (2)). The speaker may demonstrate his perception of the other's face by selecting words such that evoke conceptual contents of special domains. The speaker's intention by the choice is to associate the evoked meaning of the words with the face of other person. Words such as *dining* or *bestow* (instead of *eating* or *give*), for example, may be selectively used as referent honorifics in order to profile specific domains that would maintain or raise the positive face of others. Face-foregrounding operations of the second kind for positive politeness involve profiling the asymmetrical relationship of the participants. The alignment of this relational asymmetry may be realized in several ways. One way is to assign different degrees of focus to the entities related to participants (or participants themselves) based on the reflexive perception of their face (e.g. (4)). Positive politeness can be conveyed when something related to the addressee is described, located or evaluated is expressed as a trajector (i.e. the primary focus) and something related to the speaker is being referred to is expressed as a landmark (i.e. the secondary focus). In such construction, the difference in the degree of focus (or profiling) represents the speaker's expression of giving a priority to the face of the later. The relational asymmetry may also be realized by describing a situation or an event with a special viewing arrangement for the entities described. That is, the speaker may express positive politeness by coding them from the vantage point of the addressee (e.g. (6c), (7)). The arrangement yields a suggestion that the speaker is taking the side of the addressee with an effect that the positive face of the alter is foregrounded.

It can be said that while construal operations of positive politeness discussed in this paper basically concern entity, those of negative politeness are essentially tied to process, i.e. they bear on the illocutionary force of FTA. The mechanism of foregrounding negative face is more complex and involves more variation than that of positive face. What runs common in that variation, however, unlike positive politeness, is the indirect way the speaker foregrounds the negative face. First, negative face may be foregrounded by way of employing hedged performative for an FTA in a subordinate clause (e.g. (11)).[18] When a hedged performative is used in a main clause of a sentence, it can convey the message that an FTA in its subordinate clause is only personal or tentative; a hedged performative foregrounds negative face by way of backgrounding an FTA in the subordinate clause. The second way to foreground negative face indirectly is to profile grammatical elements of an FTA verb such as aspect and tense to mitigate an imposition (e.g. (12a), (16d), (17)).[19] Third, the speaker may choose not to profile the participants of an FTA verb by avoiding the use of a verbal expression (or a performative) for an FTA (e.g. (14b)). For the predication of the act, the speaker can instead use nominal expressions by leaving the agent and patient unsaid.

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[18] This is the reverse of nominalization for FTA mentioned above.

[19] Manipulative profiling of grammatical elements also apply to hedged performatives as in (18).

7.　Conclusion

The perspective view of pragmatics aims to reveal the relationship between contextual (i.e. social, cultural and cognitive) factors and choices the speaker makes of linguistic forms at all levels of structure (i.e. phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics).　The central claim of this view is that the speaker chooses particular 'language resources' to derive particular communicative effects that meet (or adapt to) the communicative needs of the context (Verschueren 1999).　The goal of the present study was to pursue this claim from cognitive perspective by looking at how particular forms of utterance were chosen for politeness.　The question was: "Why does the speaker design the politeness utterance this way to adapt to the need of the context?"

The point of our argument was that the question can be answered by looking into the speaker's manipulative construal operations of reality, by which an indirect message of politeness is conveyed to the addressee.　That is, the designing of politeness expressions by the speaker is derived from his strategic construal of situated information through the reflexive or intersubjective perception of face.　The construal-based analysis of politeness expressions in the present paper revealed different features of construal operations between positive politeness and negative politeness.　While the former involved nominal predication, the latter involved processual predication.　That difference is a reflection of the nature of each face: positive face involves the desire that a person's values and identity be appreciated while negative face involves a person's desire to have his freedom of action unimpeded.

The present study reveals some important insights into the cognitive mechanism of how politeness effects are derived from the particular choice of linguistics expressions. Yet a deeper understanding of this mechanism will be gained by further study with more data in wider scope.　For example, the construal operations we discussed in this paper for politeness are not exhaustive.　There would be more construal operations that account for a variety of other politeness expressions.　Further analysis of such expressions will provide us with a better and more comprehensive understanding of the general nature of construal operation for politeness.　Secondly, the discussion in this paper was based on the English language.　Since linguistic forms often reflect the characteristics of people's conceptualization of the world, a cross-linguistic analysis of politeness expressions would reveal what types of construal operations are more natural or preferred for politeness than others in one language than another.　The third point, which is related to the first, is that the present study looked at politeness in isolation.　We need to look into utterances in their communicative context to see how a politeness event consisting of multiple turns can be explained by construal operations—since one's intention, including politeness, is not always expressed in one sentence.[20]　These and

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[20]　See Hayashi (1996, 1999) for how politeness is expressed across multiple turns in discourse.

other relevant questions remain for future studies.

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